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	<title>Comments on: Overclassification &#8211; a direct threat to national security</title>
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	<link>http://heatherbrooke.org/2005/overclassification/</link>
	<description>Heather Brooke is an award-winning writer, journalist and activist</description>
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		<title>By: Iain</title>
		<link>http://heatherbrooke.org/2005/overclassification/comment-page-1/#comment-705</link>
		<dc:creator>Iain</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 May 2008 10:11:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.yrtk.org/2005/overclassification/#comment-705</guid>
		<description>As an ex RAF officer, I have some experience of classification issues.

There is in fact some reluctance to over-classify.  Protectively marked material at certain grades attracts certain
protection and monitoring requirements - including restrictions on electronic transfer.

The less highly-classified material the better, from the point of view of security staff!

In fact I&#039;ve been surprised at the relatively lowly classification of some of the material released for Hutton and from FoI
requests.  Of course, once something is classified (even classified as unclassified!) it can&#039;t be released without
authority.  The authority is usually the document originator, who may have specified a distribution list.

As all perusing this blog will know, there are FoI exemptions which can be applied regardless of the level of classification
which seems the normal method of avoiding disclosure.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As an ex RAF officer, I have some experience of classification issues.</p>
<p>There is in fact some reluctance to over-classify.  Protectively marked material at certain grades attracts certain<br />
protection and monitoring requirements &#8211; including restrictions on electronic transfer.</p>
<p>The less highly-classified material the better, from the point of view of security staff!</p>
<p>In fact I&#8217;ve been surprised at the relatively lowly classification of some of the material released for Hutton and from FoI<br />
requests.  Of course, once something is classified (even classified as unclassified!) it can&#8217;t be released without<br />
authority.  The authority is usually the document originator, who may have specified a distribution list.</p>
<p>As all perusing this blog will know, there are FoI exemptions which can be applied regardless of the level of classification<br />
which seems the normal method of avoiding disclosure.</p>
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		<title>By: Dave</title>
		<link>http://heatherbrooke.org/2005/overclassification/comment-page-1/#comment-704</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:34:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.yrtk.org/2005/overclassification/#comment-704</guid>
		<description>This is not a new problem.  Ever since I have been involved with MoD issues we have continually had problems with over classification.

There have been many examples where I have read documents and wondered why it was classified as I had read more in a magazine article that would impact on the classification requirements.   I&#039;ve even seen documents that are copies of Web Pages available on the WWW available to the general public.

Each classification comes with a clear definition of what each classification covers but the UK security community continually marks documents classified even when they clearly dont meet the requirements.   We even classify US documents that are available in the US unclassified.

Its all for our protection though so it must be OK.     Better safe than sorry.   After all no one can give any details or they can be prosecuted under the OSA and everything else can be denied.  So our backsides are protected.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is not a new problem.  Ever since I have been involved with MoD issues we have continually had problems with over classification.</p>
<p>There have been many examples where I have read documents and wondered why it was classified as I had read more in a magazine article that would impact on the classification requirements.   I&#8217;ve even seen documents that are copies of Web Pages available on the WWW available to the general public.</p>
<p>Each classification comes with a clear definition of what each classification covers but the UK security community continually marks documents classified even when they clearly dont meet the requirements.   We even classify US documents that are available in the US unclassified.</p>
<p>Its all for our protection though so it must be OK.     Better safe than sorry.   After all no one can give any details or they can be prosecuted under the OSA and everything else can be denied.  So our backsides are protected.</p>
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